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An Overview of
Fair Housing Litigation
(Part 1)
Edward G. Kramer
Kenneth J. Kowalski

Almost any lawyer with real estate clients
can find himself in the middle of a fair
housing suit.

limit its review to three principle fed
eral statutes affecting equal-housing
opportunities: Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §3(,()1

is
to give an overview of federal fair
T
housing laws and their impact on the
HE PURPOSE OF TIIlS ARTICLE

real estate industry. This article will

The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of Tia Williams, James Diggins,
and Barbara Zamlen in preparation of this article.
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et seq. (hereinafter cited as the "Act"
or "Title VIII") and the 1866 and 1870
Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§1981,
1982 (respectively "section 1981" and
"section 1982"). A review of the sub
stantive provisions of the statutes,
methods of enforcement, and judicial
interpretations are included. The ar
ticle also discusses specific evidentiary
issues, defenses, remedies, and
awards of attorneys' fees.
under
H
stand the broad coverage and
liberal judicial interpretation of these
ISTORICAL IMPACT • Tu

laws, one must examine the causes
and impact of housing segregation in
the United States. The causes include
general societal bias, government pol
icies, and, not incidentally, real estate
industry practices. For example, until
1950 the National Association of Real
Estate Boards' Code of Ethics prohib
ited realtors from making sales to
blacks in white areas. See Zuch v.
Hussey, 394E Supp. 1028, 1055 (E.D.
Mich 1975), modified on other grounds,
547 E2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977). For a
review of the role government played
in this area, see Kramer, Promises,
Promises: A New Day for Open
Housing, 21 N.Y. L.E 537 (Spring
1976). Appraiser manuals as recently
as 1975 continued to rank race and
nationality as factors affecting land
values. See McMichaels, Appraisal
Manual (Prentice-Hall, New York
City, 1975); United States v. Am. Inst.
ofReal Estate Appraisers, Etc., 442 E
Supp. 1072, 1079 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
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It is not suprising that our racially
segregated housing market often has
been cited as limiting opportunities for
minorities to obtain a decent education
and job. Our metropolitan areas have
been described as "the racial shape of a
donut with the Negroes in the hole and
with mostly whites occupying the
ring." United States v. City of Black
Jack Missouri, 508 E2d 1179, 1186
(8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1042 (1975). See Keyes v. School Dis
trict, 413 U.S. 189, 201-202 (1973);
Banksv. Perk, 341ESupp.1175, 1178
(N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'din part, rev'd in
part, 473 E2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973). It
was in this context of an"America rap
idly becoming two societies: one white
the other black-separate and une
qual" that Congress and the Courts
grappled with fair housing in 1968. Re
port ofthe National Advisory Commis
sion on Civil Disorder 1 (Bantam
Books, New York Qty, 1968).

At
F
this crucial period of our history,
Congress passed the comprehensive
AIR HOUSING LF.GISLATION •

Civil Rights Act of 1968. Title VIII of
the law was enacted "to provide,
within Constitutional limitations, for
fair housing throughout the United
States." 42 U.S.C. §3601. Later that
same year, the United States Supreme
Court rediscovered a seldom-used law
passed immediately after the Civil
War. The court declared that the law
prohibited all housing discrimination,
private as well as public, based on
race.
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The Ovil Rights Acts
of 18<>6 and 1870
Following the Civil War and the ab
olition of slavery, Congress enacted
the 1866 Civil Rights Act in an at
tempt to extend to the newly freed
slaves the rights of citizenship enjoyed
by white persons. One of the provi
sions of that act concerned the right
of a citizen to own and control prop
erty. That section, now codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1982, provides that all citi
zens shall have the same right as en
joyed by white citizens to "inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey
real and personal property."
In 1870, Congress felt the necessity
to pass another Civil Rights Act to ex
tend further the rights of citizenship
to nonwhite citizens. In the 1870 Act,
Congress included a broader provi
sion providing that "all persons . . .
have the same right ... to make and
enforce contracts . . . to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceed
ings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citi
zens . . . . " These laws received rela
tively little attention until the landmark
Supreme Court decision in Jones v.
Mayer, 392 U.S. 40'J (1968).
In Jones, a black plaintiff had
claimed a violation of section 1982
due to a refusal of a private property
owner to sell him a home solely on
racial grounds. The Eighth Circuit
had held that section 1982 applied
only to state action. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the stat
ute prohibited both public and private
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discrimination in property sales or
rentals. The Court held further that
the statute was a constitutional exer
cise of congressional power under the
thirteenth amendment.
Section 1982
Of the two statutes, section 1982 is
used most often by fair housing attor
neys. Section 1981, the broader civil
rights law, is generally relied on in
housing litigation when there are no
specific discriminatory practices in
volved. Fair Housing-Fair Lending,
~3152 (P-H) (1985). Section 1982,
however, is used more often to attack
specific discriminatory practices. For
instanee, section 1982 has been held
to prohibit:
• A refusal to sell lots to black peo
ple. McHaney v. Spears, 526 E Supp.
566 (W.D. Tenn. 1981);
• A homeowners' association's dis
criminatory interference with the sale
of a home to a black person. Phillips
v. Hunter Trails Community Ass'n,
685 E2d 184 (7th Cir. 1982);
• Racial-based steering. Fair Ho~ng
Council of Bergen County, Inc. v. E.
Bergen County Multiple Listing Serv.,
Inc., 482 E Supp. 1071 (D. N.J.
1976);
• Selection procedures. Jordan v.
Del/way Villa of Tennessee Ltd., 661 E
2d 588 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1008 (1982); and
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• Racially motivated opposition to
the construction of low-income hous
ing. Bendetson v. Payson, 534 F.
Supp. 539 (D. Mass. 1982).
Often, section 1982 is used in con
junction with the Act or section 1981.
See, e.g., Marable v. H. Walker & As
socs., 644 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1981);

Gentry v. Northeast Management
Co., Inc., 472 F. Supp. 1248 (N.D.
Tex. 1979); Young v. Pi.erce, 544 F.
Supp. 1010, 1019 (E.D. Tex. 1982).
Section 1982 is not, however, coex
tensive with the Act. First, it prohibits
only discrimination based on race or
color and does not apply to cases of
discrimination based on religion, sex,
or national origin. Second, unlike the
Act, it contains no exemptions. There
are other differences, which will be
discussed below, concerning such is
sues as:
• Standing;
• The statute of limitations;
• Limits on punitive damages; and
• A showing necessary for an award
of attorneys' fees.
Although section 1982 deals only
with discrimination because of race or
color, claims under the statute are not
limited to black plaintiffs. Many
courts have held that a white person
who is the victim of racially discrimi
natory acts may seek redress under
section 1982. For instance, a section
1982 claim can be made for the evic
tion or attempted eviction of white

JANUARY

tenants who entertain black guests, or
the denial of housing to a white per
son because of his spouse's or room
mate's race. See Woods-Drake v.
Lundy, fJ61 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1982);
Bills v. Hodges, 628 F.2d 844 (4th Cir.
1980); Rupe v. Fourman, 532 F. Supp.
344 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Bishop v. Pec
sok, 431 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Ohio
1976); Oliver v. Shelly, 538 F. Supp.
(JOO (S.D. Tex. 1982); Lamb v. Sallee,
417 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Ky. 1976).
Yet, although a white person can
raise a claim under section 1982, such
a claim will not stand unless some ra
cially motivated discrimination is al
leged. Thus in Schneider v. Bahler, 564
F. Supp. 1449 (N.D. Ind. 1983), a sec
tion 1982 claim by white plaintiffs al
leging nonracial discrimination was
dismissed.

Tide VIII
The 1960s saw significant progress
in the attainment of civil rights for mi
norities. Particularly as a result of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Vot
ing Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.
§1971 et seq., progress was made in
opening public accommodations to
minorities, the dual school systems
began to be desegregated, and more
employment opportunities became
available. Housing discrimination,
however, was openly practiced in
many communities.
Finally, with the strong backing of
President Lyndon Johnson, Congress
addressed the problem of housing dis
crimination with a federal fair housing
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law, passed as Title VIII, which is now
codified at 42 u.s.c. § 3(i()l et. seq.
Purpose

It has been observed that the Act
was intended to promote "open, inte
grated residential housing patterns
and to prevent the increase ofsegrega
tion, in ghettos, of racial groups
whose lack of opportunities the Act
was designed to combat." Otero v.
New Turk City Hous. Auth., 484 E2d
1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973). Recogniz
ing the strong commitment to open
housing voiced by Congress, other
courts have held that the Act must be
broadly interpreted. See Metropolitan

Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 558 E2d 1283,
1289 (7th Cir. 1977) and cases cited
therein.

Prohibited Conduct
Title VIII contains comprehensive
prohibitions against discrimination.
Section 3(i()4 of the Act prohibits dis
crimination in the sale or rental of
housing on the basis of race, color, reli
gion, sex, or national origin, including:
• Refusing to sell or rent after a bona
fide offer has been made;
• Discriminating on the terms, condi
tions, or privileges of a sale or lease or
in providing services or facilities;
• Indicating any preference based on
race or other like criteria in advertise
ments for housing;
• False representations as to the
availability of a dwelling unit; and
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• Attempting to persuade owners to
sell or rent dwellings by making repre
sentations about the entry into the
neighborhood of persons of a certain
race.
Exempted from the foregoing pro
hibitions, except for that concerning
advertising, are single-family homes
sold or rented without the use of a
broker and rooms or units in dwell
ings for less than four families if the
owner resides in one of the rooms or
units. 42 U.S.C. §3(i()3(b). The latter
exemption for the owner-occupied
dwelling is known as the "Mrs. Mur
phy" exception. See, e.g., U.S. v.
Hunter, 459 E2d 205 (4th Cir.1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972). Also
exempted is the sale or rental of dwell
ings by a religious organization to its
members as long as membership in
the religion is not discriminatory. 42
u.s.c. §3(i()7.
The Act prohibits discrimination in
the finaneing of housing, including
loans for purchasing, constructing,
improving, repairing, or maintaining
a home. 42 U.S.C. §3(!()5. Also pro
hibited is discriminatory denial of ac
cess to or membership in a multiple
listing service or real estate broker
organization. 42 U.S.C. §3(i()6.
The Act makes it unlawful to co
erce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere
with a person exercising rights or aid
ing or encouraging another in the ex
ercise of rights granted or protected
by the Act. 42 U.S.C. §3617. Attor
neys with clients in the real estate busi
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ness should also be aware of the possi
bility of criminal charges that can be
brought under Title IX of the 1968
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §3631, for
intimidation by the use of force or
threat of force against activities pro
tected by Title VIII.
Finally, the United States Supreme
Court has recognized that a claim un
der the Act can be tried by a jury. Cur
tis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974). In
drafting either the fair housing com
plaint or answer, the lawyer must de
cide whether to demand a trial by
jury.
Experience in this area indicates
that the request for a jury is usually
demanded by the defense. This reli
ance may well be misplaced, however,
considering the substantial verdicts in
fair housing cases often rendered by
all-white juries. Friedman, Damages
in Housing Bias Litigation, 21 N.Y. L.
E 551, 554-558 (1976).
State Laws and Local Ordinances
As of March 1986, 44 states had en
acted fair-housing laws. In addition,
hundreds of localities now have fair
housing ordinances. State fair-hous
ing laws vary considerably, but most
are very comprehensive. Generally,
discrimination in both the sale and
rental of housing is prohibited, as is
discrimination in the financing of
residential properties.
Many states have administrative
agencies armed with the authority to
receive and investigate complaints
and to undertake conciliation efforts.
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Usually these agencies have been au
thorized to issue cease and desist or
ders after a hearing and to seek court
enforcement of those orders.
Local fair-housing ordinances vary
considerably both in what is covered
and how they are enforced. Some are
very comprehensive, others cover
only certain activities of brokers.
Many simply prescribe criminal pen
alties and make no provision for ad
ministrative enforcement.
The Effect ofthe Act
Of importance to the practitioner is
the way the Act is affected by the rele
vant state law or local ordinance. Sec
tion 3610(c) of the Act provides that
whenever a state or local fair-housing
law provides rights and remedies for
alleged discriminatory housing prac
tices that are "substantially equivalent"
to the rights and remedies supplied by
the Act, the United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development
("HUD") is to refer any complaint
filed to the appropriate state or local
agency. 42 U.S.C. §3610(c). If the state
or local agency commences action on
the complaint within 30 days, HUD is
to take no further action.
More importantly, under section
3(i()l (d) of the Act the complainant can
bring a civil action in federal court if
HUD has been unable to obtain volun
tary compliance within 30 days. 42
U.S.C. §3610(d). If, however, the com
plainant has a judicial remedy under a
"substantially equivalent" state or local
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law, he is precluded from proceeding
in federal court and is relegated to the
state or local remedies.
Whether the state or local law is
substantially equivalent to the Act is
not always easily determined. Because
it has been charged with making such
a determination, HUD has developed
a procedure for recognizing substan
tially equivalent laws. The determina
tion is based on two separate inqui
ries:
• Whether the state or local law on its
face provides rights and remedies that
are substantially equivalent; and
• Whether the administration of the
state or local law is such that, in fact,
complainants are provided equivalent
rights and remedies. 24 C.ER. §115.2
(1986).
HUD publishes a list of those states
and localities whose fair housing laws
it has determined to be substantially
equivalent. As of the latest revision,
the laws of 39 states and 57 localities
had been determined to be substan
tially equivalent. 24 C.ER. §115.11
(1986).
Although HUD's determination
concerning any particular state or lo
cal law is not binding upon a court, it
is entitled to great weight, especially
when it has been consistently main
tained over a long period of time. See
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 400 U.S. 205 (1972); North Ha
ven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512
(1982).
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The Act created
three methods for its enforce
E
ment. The statute establishes an ad
NFORCEMENT •

ministrative procedure to assist in the
conciliation of housing discrimina
tion complaints. 42 U.S.C. §3610.
The Secretary of HUD is charged
with handling these complaints,
which must be in writing. 42 U.S.C.
§3610(a).
Under this statutory scheme HUD
has 30 days to:
• Conduct an initial investigation;
• Decide if conciliation can settle the
dispute; and
• Notify the parties of its intent to re
solve the complaint. Id.
The statute provides that a com
plainant may file a private lawsuit to
enforce rights protected by this sec
tion between the thirty-first and sixti
eth day after the filing of the com
plaint with HUD. 42 U.S.C. §3610(d).
Failure to take this action will result in
the loss of the right to file suit under
section 3610(c) of the Aet. Waters v.
Provident Nat'/ Bank, 521 E Supp.
1025 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Tatum v.
Myrick, 425 E Supp. 809 (M.D. Fla.
1977). It is possible to extend the 180
day statute-of-limitations period un
der the Act. By filing the HUD com
plaint on the one-hundred-eightieth
day, section 3610 of the Act permits a
party to file a federal lawsuit 240 days
after the housing discrimination oc
curred.
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The Conciliation P~
The conciliation process is fairly in
formal. Usually a HUD investigator
will get the parties, who may or may
not be represented by attorneys, to
gether to discuss the nature of the
complaint and the strength of the evi
dence supporting it. Generally, no.
witnesses are present besides the com
plainant and the respondent. There is
no testimony as such and the meeting
is not recorded.
The purpose is to try to reach a set
tlement prior to the filing of a court
action. Such a settlement can consist
of an apology, a monetary settlement,
or affirmative aetion (that is, agree
ment by the respondent to have its
staff undergo fair housing training, to
market affirmatively, to pay for fu
ture auditing, and the like), or all of
the above. If HUD is unable to re
solve the matter successfully, the com
plainant may proceed to file a federal
court action - assuming the statute
of-limitations period has not been ex
ceeded.
Unlike Title Vil of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e et
seq., dealing with employment dis
crimination, victims of housing bias
may simply avoid the administrative
process by filing a lawsuit under sec
tion 3612 of the Act. The Supreme
Court has held that section 3612 pro
vides an independent remedy which
may be pursued at the same time
HUD is investigating a section 3610
complaint. Gladstone Realtors v. Vil
lage of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109
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(1979). See42 U.S.C. § 3612(a), how
ever, which requires a court to stay le
gal action prior to any trial, if it ap
pears that HUD's conciliation efforts
are likely to be successful. This is con
sistent with section 3610(f) requiring
HUD to terminate all efforts to con
ciliate a complaint when the matter
comes to trial.
The last method of enforcement is
the institution of litigation by the At
torney General of the United States.
42 U.S.C. §3613. To file a lawsuit un
der this provision, the Justice Depart
ment must prove that a "pattern or
practice" of housing discrimination is
occurring that raises an issue of gen
eral public importanee. United States
v. Pelzer Realty Co., Inc., 484 E2d
438, 444 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 936 (1974). The Attorney
General need not, however, meet this
requirement to enforce HUD-ap
proved conciliation agreements. See
United States v. Reece, 457 E Supp.
43, 47 (D. Mont. 1981).
One important consideration is
that the 180-day statute-of-limitation

OVERVIEW OF FAIR HOUSING LITIGATION
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provision does not apply to the
United States. United States v. Sum
merlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940); United
States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789 (5th
Cir. 1978). Therefore, a crucial de
fense concerning a limitation period is
not available when the Government is
bringing the action against the land
lord or seller.
The stat
P
utes outlined above broadly pro
hibit discrimination in housing. Some
ROHIBITED PRACTICES.

of the specific acts and practices pro
hibited are enumerated in the statutes;
others have been defined through liti
gation. Since 1968, the year the Act
was passed and Jones v. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968), was decided, the
courts have had ample opportunity to
interpret many of the provisions of
the federal laws prohibiting housing
discrimination.
The primary lesson for practition
ers to be drawn from the case law
since 1968 is that these statutes, espe
cially Title VIII, are to be construed
broadly. As stated by the Eighth Cir
cuit Court of Appeals in a passage of
ten quoted by other courts:
"Recent cases make clear that the stat
utes prohibit all forms of discrimi
nation, sophisticated as well as sim
ple-minded, and thus disparity of
treatment between white and blacks,
burdensome application procedures,
and tactics of delay, hinderance, and
special treatment must receive short
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shrift from the courts." Williams v.
Mathews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 (8th
Cir.1974)
As is shown in the cases discussed
in the following sections identifying
specific prohibited practices, the
courts have become adept at looking
"beyond the form of a transaction to
its substance" and finding and pro
scribing "practices which actually or
predictively result in racial discrimina
tion, irrespective defendant's motiva
tion." Id.
Refusal To Sell or Rent

The most obvious form of housing
discrimination, and the first practice
to be prohibited in Title VIII, is the
refusal to sell or rent or to negotiate
for a sale or rental on the basis of pro
hibited criteria. Clearly, the apart
ment manager who tells a black apart
ment seeker that he cannot become a
tenant because he is black violates the
law. Such a fact situation is rare.
More common is the situation in
which the apartment seekers are not
told the real reason and, at trial, the
apartment manager offers "business
reasons" that, for some reason, do
not seem to disqualify whites. Harper
v. Hutton, 594 F.2d 1091, 1092 (6th
Cir. 1979) (which held that a refusal to
rent to a black couple was due not to
"business reasons" but to the fact that
the couple was black and poor). Such
a refusal to rent to a bona fide home
seeker violates Title VIII and section
1982. Note that section 3()()4(a) pro
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vides a cause of action only for the
refusal to sell or rent after the making
of a bona fide offer. A tester, not be
ing a bona fide homeseeker, has no
cause of aetion under that subsection.
A refusal to rent to an interracial
couple is also a violation of Title VIII
and section 1982, even assuming the
refusal to be based on a good-faith
belief that interracial marriages lead
to tension and thus to disturbances.
Oliver v. Shelly, 538 F. Supp. fJOO (S.D.
Tex. 1982). As long as raee is a faetor
in the decision not to rent, there is a
violation.
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are set for a sale and those conditions
will necessarily have a discriminatory
impact on minorities. For instance,
there are two remarkably similar deci
sions concerning the sale of lots with
restrictions as to particular builders
permitted to construct homes on
those lots. Williams v. Matthews Co.,
499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir.1974); McHaney
v. Spears, 526 F. Supp. 566 (W.D.
Tenn. 1981). In both cases, the courts
found that the policy discriminated
against blacks.
Of course, not every refusal to sell
or rent to a minority will be found to
be discriminatory. As long as the deci
sion is not in any way racially moti
vated, liability should not exist. KaJr
Ian v. 442 Wellington Cooperative
Corp., 567 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. lll.
1983).

Disguised Refusals
A refusal to sell a home on the basis
of race of the buyer, no matter how
disguised, is also a violation. Thus, a
builder who signs sham contracts and
puts up "sold" signs in order not to
have to renegotiate for the sale of
homes to blacks, violates the law, as
does a realtor who describes a list
price for a condominium as firm to
blacks but as negotiable to whites.
United States v. Pelzer Realty Co.,
Inc., 484 F.2d 438 (5th Cir.1973);
Hobson v. Humphreys, Inc., 563 F.
Supp. 344 (W.D. Tenn. 1982). A dis
criminatory refusal to allow the pur
chase of a part of a co-operative
building is similarly prohibited. Ro
binson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610
F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979).

To Otherwise Make
Unavailable or Deny Rental or Sale
Section 3604(a) of the Act not only
prohibits an outright refusal to sell or
rent, but also states that it is unlawful
to "otherwise make unavailable or
deny, a dwelling to any person" for a
discriminatory reason. 42 U.S.C.
§3604(a). This "catch-all" phrase
seems to be as broad as Congress
could have made it and, consequently,
"all practices which have the effect of
denying dwellings on prohibited
grounds are therefore unlawful."

Discriminatory Impact
A discriminatory refusal to sell will
also be found when certain conditious

United States v. Youritan Constr. Co.,
370 F. Supp. 643, 648 (N.D. Cal.
1973), afj"d, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir.
1975). Thus not only is an outright re
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fusal to sell or rent illegal, but any
practice that may have that effect is
also forbidden, such as:
• The use of more burdensome appli
cation procedures;
• The use of delaying tactics; or
• Supplying prospective black ten
ants with incomplete information. Id.
In short, housing suppliers should
be aware that differential treatment
of any housing seeker on prohibited
grounds can result in liability.
Other Prohibited Practices
One of the practices that has been
held to fall under this prohibition is
the "grudging acceptance" of blacks
as compared to· enthusiastic accept
ance or solicitation of whites. United
States v. Peker Realty Co., 484 E2d
438 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Treasure Lakes, Inc., 1 EOH §13,(i()()
(W.D. Pa. 1973).
Also prohibited by section 3(>()4(a)
is the refusal to finance housing in ra
cially integrated neighborhoods, a
practice commonly referred to as
"redlining." Lau/man v. Oakley Bldg.
& Loan Co., 408 E Supp. 489 (S.D.
Ohio); Harrison v. Otto G. Hein
zeroth Co., 414 E Supp. 66 (N.D.
Ohio 1976); 430 E Supp. 893 (N.D.
Ohio 1977). In the latter case, the
court held that white plaintiffs could
assert such a claim and further found
that the practice of requiring a much
higher down payment for a home in
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an integrated area also violated sec
tions 3604(c) and 3617 of the Act.
Redlining also violates section 3()()5.
Whether insurance redlining also
violates the "otherwise makes unavail
able" provision is an open question.

Compare Dunn v. Midwestern In
dem., 472 E Supp. 1106 (S.D. Ohio
1979); Mackey v. Nationwide Ins.
Cos., 724 E2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984). It
should be noted that in Mackey, the
court, while holding that insurance
redlining was not covered under the
Act and that the plaintiff, a black in
surance agent, did not have standing
to raise a claim under sections 1981
and 1982, did state that the home
owners involved, as the direct victims
of the alleged discrimination, may
have a cause of action under sections
1981 and 1982. In the same vein, it
has been held that Act section 3604(a)
does cover racially discriminatory
home appraisals. United States v.

Am. InSt. of Real Estate Appraisers,
442 E Supp. 1072 (N.D.

m. 1977), a[r

peal dismissed, 590 E2d 242 (7th
Cir.1978).
Some other practices that have
been held to come under this particu
lar prohibition are:
• The lockout of black tenants on the
basis of race;
• The interference with black neigh
bors' access to their property; and
• Racially motivated attempts to in
timidate and interfere with the devel
opment of low-income housing
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through allegedly groundless objec
tions at administrative hearings and
appeals. Shaw v. Cassar, 558 F. Supp.
303 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Evans v.
'Jilbbe, 651E2cl661 (5th Cir.1981) (a
white neighbor erected a gate denying
access to the only road leading to the
property of black neighbors and gave
the keys to the whites but not to the
blacks); Bendetson v. Payson, 534 E
Supp. 539 (D. Mass. 1982).
Attorneys' Advice
In light of the broad reach of the
statute, attorneys advising realtors or
landlords should counsel them to
avoid any behavior that is or could be
considered discriminatory. In fact,
positive steps can be taken ahead of
time both to insure against acts of dis
crimination and to minimize the po
tential damages should these acts oc

cur.
First, all realtors and landlords
should develop standardized methods
. of selecting and treating tenants and
prospective purchasers. Employees
should be instructed and trained to
apply those methods to all persons,
regardless of race or sex. Realtors and
owners of large rental properties may
want to consider having staff undergo
training by fair housing agencies.
That training would not only help to
educate employers, but would also
identify any practices that could have
a discriminatory impact. Further
more, evidence of participation in
that training could reduce the likeli
hood or amount of an award of puni
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tive damages should discrimination
occur and be proven in a lawsuit. Mc
Donald v. Verble, 622 F.2cl 1227 (6th
Cir. 1980).
In the same manner, an affirmative
marketing agreement entered into
with HUD or a local municipality, or
both, may be helpful in avoiding liti
gation. At the very least the fair hous
ing logo showing that the renter or
broker provides housing to all per
sons on an equal basis should be
prominently displayed at rental and
sales offices.
Racial Steering
Another practice that has been held
to make housing unavailable and,
therefore, unlawful, is "racial steer
ing," defined by the Supreme Court as:
"A practice by whieh real estate bro
kers and agents preserve and encour
age patterns of racial segregation in
available housing by steering mem
bers of racial and ethnic groups to
buildings occupied primarily by mem
bers of such racial and ethnic groups
and away from buildings and neigh
borhoods inhabited primarily by
members of other races or groups."
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455
U.S. 363, 366 n.1. (1982).
Any word, phrase, or action of a
realtor that may have the effect of
steering or ehannelling a prospective
buyer into a particular area, regard
less of whether the attempt is success
ful, is unlawful. Zuch v. Hussey, 394
F. Supp. 1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975),
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aff'd and remanded, 547 F.2d 1168
(6th Cir. 1975). Steering tenants to
particular apartments is similarly un
lawful. United States v. Mitchell, 580
F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Henshaw Brothers, Inc., 401 F.
Supp. 399 (E.D. Va. 1974). Proof of
steering alone is sufficient to sustain a
finding of discrimination. Moore v.
Townsend, 525 F.2d 482 (7th Cir.
1975).
The kind of practices that may
result in a finding of unlawful steering
include:
• Selective listing and viewing of
properties;
• Misleading statements;
• Limited and selective advertising;
• Discriminatory treatment or as
signment of black sales agents; and
• Discriminatory treatment of bro
kers who regularly deal with black cli
ents. See Fair Housing Council of
Bergen County, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen
County Multiple Listing Serv., Inc.,
422 F. Supp. 1071 (D. N.J. 1976);
United States v. Real Estate One, Inc.,
433 F. Supp. 1140 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
In addition to direct proof of dis
criminatory treatment of actual
homeseckers or testers, census data
can also be of use in determining
whether steering has taken place.
There is a wide range of data sources
for population and housing charac
teristics easily available from the
United States Departments of Labor
and Commerce. See, e.g., U.S. Bu
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reau of Labor Statistics, Department
of Labor, Bulletin No. 1879, Direc
tory of Data Sources of Racial and
Ethnic Minorities (1975). The United
States Department of Commerce has
established the Standard Metropoli
tan Statistical Areas (SMSA), which
are economic areas to be used for the
comparison of census data.
Discrimination in
Tenns and Conditions
Section 3604(b) proscribes discrim
ination in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental or in the
provision of services or facilities in
connection with housing. Covered by
this provision and by section 1982 are
practices such as charging blacks
higher prices for property or services
than would be charged to whites, or
even requiring blacks but not whites
to pay closing costs. Clark v. Univer
sal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070
(1974); Hobson v. Humphreys, Inc.,
563 F. Supp. 344 (W.D. Teun. 1982);
United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484
F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 939 (1974). Also prohibited
is unequal maintenance and upkeep
for black residents. Hawkins v. 'Jbwn
of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir.
1971), reversed and remanded, 461
F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (liability un
der the fourteenth amendment).
Advertising
It is unlawful to make, print, or
publish any discriminatory notice,
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statement, or advertisement with re
spect to the sale or rental of a prop
erty. 42 U.S.C. §3604(c). The provi
sion has been upheld against first
amendment challenge and applied to
media carrying such advertisements
as well as the persons who place them.
United States v. Hunter, 459 R2d 205
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934
(1972). Implicitly, as well as explicity,
discriminatory advertisements are
prohibited. Id.
Instructions to employees to dis
criminate are also covered by this sec
tion, as are the recording and distribu
tion of racially restrictive covenants.
United States v. Reddoch, 1 EOH
,13,569 (S.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd, 467
R2d 897 (5th Cir. 1972); Mayers v.
Ridley, 465 R2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Selective advertising on the basis of
race is also prohibited by this section
as well as by Act section 3604(a), since
that practice has the effect of steering.
United States v. Real&late One, Inc.,
433 R Supp. 1140 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
Misrepresentations
Regarding Availability
Under Act section 3604(d) it is un
lawful to represent for a discrimina
tory reason that a property is unavail
able for sale or rental if it is available.
Prohibited are simple false statements
to blacks that property is unavailable
as well as more subtle methods of
misinformation, such as placing
"sold" signs in front of houses that
have not actually been sold for the
purposes of not having to deal with
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blacks. United States v. Reddoch, 1
EOH ,13,569 (S.D. Ala. 1972), afj'd,
467 R2d 897 (5th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Pelzer Realty, 484 R2d 438
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
936 (1974).
Block Busting
Another practice that is specifically
prohibited is "block busting." Section
3604(e) of the Act states that it is un
lawful:
"For profit, to induce or attempt to
induce any person to sell or rent any
dwelling by representations regarding
the entry or prospective entry into the
neighborhood of a person or persons
of a particular race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin."
The purpose of this section is to pre
vent realtors from "preying upon the
fears of property owners in racially
transitional areas" to induce panic
selling. Zuch v. Hussey, 394 R Supp.
at 1049. The statute has been upheld
against first amendment challenge
since it prohibits conduct, not speech.
United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty,
Inc., 474 R2d 115 (5th Cir. 1971).
Analydng Block Busting
To determine whether particular
solicitations would constitute a "block
busting" violation, the section can be
broken down to its elements:

• Whether the solicitations are made
for profit;
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• Whether the solicitations were in
tended to induce the sale of property;
and
• Whether the solicitations would
convey to a reasonable man, under
the circumstances, that members of a
particular race are moving into the
neighborhood. Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F.
Supp. at 1049.
The "for-profit" requirement does
not mean that the solicitor intended to
buy the property and sell it at a higher
price. Instead, the term has its ordi
nary meaning and covers the normal
activity of a real estate broker. United
States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305
(D. Md. 1969); Sanborn v. Wagner,
354 F. Supp. 291 (D. Md. 1973).
The second element of the subsee
tion, the intent to induce a sale, is a
question of fact in each particular
case. Whether a representation made
in response to a question of a home
owner can be held unlawful will prob
ably depend on the circumstances and
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the content of the answer. United
States v. Saroff, 377 F. Supp. 352
(E.D. Tenn. 1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 902
(6th Cir. 1975); But see Zuch v. Hus
sey, 394 F. Supp. aH051.
The third element is governed by a
"reasonable man" test. Because repre
sentations may be either obvious or
subtle, the problem is to determine
whether the representation made
"would convey to a reasonable person
in the solicited area that blacks were
seeking to move into the neighbor
hood." Heights Community Congress
v. Hilltop Realty, Inc., 774 F.2d 135,
142(6thCir. 1985), cert. denied, 106S.
Ct. 1206 (1986). This determination
may require a careful inquiry into the
conditions and atmosphere in the par
ticular neighborhood solicited. See
United States v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp.
476 (N.D. Ga. 1971), in which the
court indicates the types of questions
that should be asked.
(To be continued)

The first black family entering an all-white neighborhood tends to pay
more for the housing than would be paid by white families purchasing
the identical house. Then because of the fears generated, the percep
tion of white residents in the area causes a great many white people to
put up a great many houses for sale within a very short period of time.
This flooding of the market tends to have a negative effect on the price
stablization of the housing in that area.
You may also aehieve social and psychological stability when a
neighborhood becomes black because what you have done is re
segregated the neighborhood and the process of change, of transition,
is already in tile past.
Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1032 (1975), modif. on
other grds, 547 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1977)
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The Practical Lawyer's Real Property Law Manual (1974).
Resource Materials: Condomiuinm, Planned Unit Development and
Conversion Documents (2d ed. 1983).
Resource Materials: Modern Real Estate Transactions (2 vols., 6th ed.
1985).
Sales of Real Property, by Samuel A. Goldberg (1971).
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vember 1985, p. 53.
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B. Davis, THE PRACTICAL REAL ESTATE LAWYER, January 1985, p. 71.
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The Natnre of Property Interests, by William Parsons, THE PRACTI
CAL LAWYER, June 1983, p. 61.
Outlines in The ALI-ABA Course Materials Journal
Comparative Statistics in Title VII Litigation, by Lawrence Allen
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Rights under Section 1983, by Martin A. Schwartz, THE ALl-ABA
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